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11 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) activities to develop new products or to improve the
quality of existing products are a crucial part of ﬁrms’ activities, particularly in high-
technology industries. This type of R&D is called product R&D and is distinguished from
process R&D, which aims to reduce production costs.1 Some data show that product R&D
is empirically more important than process R&D (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Fritsch and
Meschede, 2001).2 As product-R&D-intensive industries tend to be highly concentrated,
ﬁrms may invest strategically in product R&D. Consequently, it is unlikely that socially
optimal product qualities are chosen by individual ﬁrms. Moreover, although social wel-
fare is higher when the superior ﬁrms produce higher quality products, ﬁrms with inferior
technology may strategically produce higher quality products than ﬁrms with superior
technology. Thus, government intervention may be required. The important issue is to
determine a policy that can induce ﬁrms to choose socially optimal product qualities.
In order to examine this issue, we make a signiﬁcant departure from the existing lit-
erature on endogenous quality choice in the following two respects. First, we analyze
the case of asymmetric cost of product R&D with a small technology gap between ﬁrms.
Although symmetric duopoly (Aoki, 2003; Aoki and Prusa, 1997; Jinji, 2003) and asym-
metric duopoly with a large technology gap (Park, 2001; Zhou et al., 2002) have been
1Symeonidis (2003a) points out that product R&D directly aﬀects the consumer surplus, whereas process R&D aﬀects it
only indirectly. Product R&D directly aﬀects consumers’ utility because it improves product quality. Process R&D reduces
marginal production costs and hence aﬀects consumers’ utility only indirectly through an increase in output. Recent works
on product R&D include Symeonidis (2003a), Bonanno and Haworth (1998), and Lin and Saggi (2002).
2Scherer and Ross (1990) note that about three-quarters of R&D expenditure by ﬁrms in the United States falls into
the category of product R&D. Fritsch and Meschede (2001) show that the share of product R&D in all R&D expenditure
in German ﬁrms is about 61%.
2examined, the intermediate case has received less attention, despite its relevance in the
real world.3 The small gap case is quite diﬀerent from the large gap case because in the
former multiple equilibria exist in the stage of quality choice. In the latter, the equilibrium
is unique. This contrast makes the optimal policy quite diﬀerent. Second, we explicitly
take into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. It is common in the literature to
assume that the quality ordering of the two ﬁrms is exogenously given (Ronnen, 1991;
Toshimitsu, 2003). That is, one ﬁrm always produces a higher quality product than the
rival. However, unless there is a suﬃciently large technology gap between ﬁrms, there ex-
ist two equilibria and the quality ordering is endogenously determined. We show that the
endogeneity of quality ordering has important implications for the optimal R&D policy.
The model in this paper is a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly with ﬁxed costs of quality
improvement. Our main purpose is to investigate the optimal R&D policy in a second-
best environment, in the sense that the government takes the duopolistic market structure
as given. We examine both Bertrand and Cournot cases in the ﬁnal stage of the game.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that with a small technology gap
the optimal R&D policy is characterized by ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy schedules,t h a ti s ,b y
subsidies contingent on product qualities. Traditional ﬂat subsidies would not work, even
if they were allowed to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc. The subsidy schedules induce the ﬁrm with
relatively better technology to choose the higher quality product at the socially optimal
level and induce the other ﬁrm to choose the lower quality product at the socially optimal
level. As there are two asymmetric equilibria in the unregulated market, the R&D policy
3One exception is Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004), who examine the eﬀects of minimum quality standards under asymmetric
duopoly with a small technology gap. Moreover, in the case of process R&D, Lahiri and Ono (1999) address the issue of
optimal R&D policy in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly.
3needs to select the socially preferred equilibrium, as well as correct distortions in product
quality. In other words, the R&D subsidy/tax is used to not only correct distortions in
R&D activities but also prevent a technological follower from leapfrogging and becoming a
quality leader in the industry. Although the ﬁrst role of R&D subsidy/tax is well-known,4
the anti-leapfrogging nature of R&D subsidy/tax is new to the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 examines the optimal R&D policy when ﬁrms engage in price competition at
the ﬁnal stage. Section 4 analyzes the case of quantity competition. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is a version of the standard model of vertical diﬀerentiation.5 There is a
continuum of consumers indexed by θ, which is uniformly distributed on [0,1] with density
one. Each consumer is assumed to either buy one unit of the vertically diﬀerentiated good
or nothing. Consumer θ’s (indirect) utility is given by u = θq − p if he buys one unit of
a product of quality q ∈ [0,∞)a tp r i c ep ∈ [0,∞). His utility is zero if he buys nothing.
There are two ﬁrms in the market. Each ﬁrm oﬀers a single product. The marginal and
average production costs are assumed to be invariant with respect to both quality and
quantity.6 For simplicity, we let these costs be zero. The cost of product R&D is diﬀerent
across ﬁrms. Without loss of generality, we assume that ﬁrm 2 has lower technology so
that it has to incur higher cost of product R&D than ﬁrm 1 for the same q.L e tF(q)b e
4See, for example, Lambertini and Mosca (1999) and Toshimitsu (2003) for the case of product R&D and Spence (1984)
and Lahiri and Ono (1999) for the case of process R&D.
5See, for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), Ronnen (1991), and Aoki (2003).
6This is a standard assumption in the literature. See, for example, Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) and Ronnen (1991).
4ﬁrm 1’s cost of product R&D. Firm 2’s R&D cost is given by γF(q), where γ ≥ 1. We
assume F(q)=kqn,w h e r ek is a positive constant and n is any integer such that n ≥ 2.
The government implements R&D policy, which is potentially a subsidy schedule. Let
si < 1 be a subsidy for ﬁrm i. A negative si means an R&D tax. Taking the duopolistic
market structure as given, the government chooses si to maximize social welfare W,w h i c h
is the sum of ﬁrm’s proﬁts (πi) and consumer’s surplus (CS) minus social cost of subsidy:
W = π
1 + π
2 + CS − s1F(q1) − s2γF(q2)
= R
1 − F(q1)+R
2 − γF(q2)+CS, (1)
where Ri is ﬁrm i’s revenue. The government chooses R&D policy in stage 1. In stage 2
ﬁrms simultaneously choose the quality of their products. In stage 3 ﬁrms compete either
in prices or in quantities. The solution is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
3 R&D Policy under Bertrand Competition
3.1 Revenue and quality best-response
In this section, we examine the case in which ﬁrms compete in prices at the ﬁnal stage.




     
     
4q2
i(qi − qj)
(4qi − qj)2 , if qi >q j,
qjqi(qj − qi)
(4qj − qi)2 , if qi <q j,
(2)
for i,j =1 ,2.
Firm 1 and ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts are given by π1(q1,q 2;s1)=R1(q1,q 2) − (1 − s1)F(q1)a n d
π2(q1,q 2;γ,s2)=R2(q1,q 2) − (1 − s2)γF(q2), respectively. In stage 2, each ﬁrm chooses
5quality to maximize its own proﬁts, given its rival’s quality and subsidies. Firm 1’s quality
best-response, q1 = B1(q2;s1), is then deﬁned as B1(q2;s1)=qH
1 (q2;s1)i fq2 ≤ ˆ q2(s1)a n d
B1(q2;s1)=qL
1 (q2;s1)i fq2 ≥ ˆ q2(s1), where each of qH
i (qj;si)a n dqL
i (qj;si)s a t i s ﬁ e s
∂π
1(q1,q 2;s1)/∂q1 ≡ π
1
1(q1,q 2;s1)=0 , (3)
with qL
1 (q2;s1) ≤ q2 ≤ qH
1 (q2;s1), and ˆ q2(s1)s a t i s ﬁ e sπ1(qH
1 (ˆ q2;s1), ˆ q2(s1);s1)=
π1(qL
1 (ˆ q2;s1), ˆ q2(s1);s1). That is, ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent between qH
1 (q2;s1)a n dqL
1 (q2;s1)
when ﬁrm 2’s product quality is ˆ q2(s1). Since ∂2R1/∂q2
1 < 0a n dF   (q1) > 0, the
second-order condition is satisﬁed for both qH
1 (q2;s1)a n dqL
1 (q2;s1). Firm 2’s quality
best-response, q2 = B2(q1;γ,s2), is deﬁned analogously.
The properties of Bi(qj;si) are as follows: (i) Bi(qj;si)  = qj,∀qj; (ii) Bi(qj;si)i sd i s c o n -
tinuous at qj =ˆ qj(si); (iii) dBi(qj;si)/dqj > 0,∀qj  =ˆ qj(sj); and (iv) dBi(qj;si)/dsi > 0.
The third property implies that qualities are strategic complements.
Each ﬁrm’s quality best-response curve is depicted in Figure 1. In the ﬁgure, the solid
lines of Bi represent ﬁrm i’s quality best-response in the unregulated market. B1 (resp.
B2) is discontinuous at q2 =ˆ q2(0) (resp. q1 =ˆ q1(γ,0)).
3.2 Optimal R&D policy
Nash equilibria (NEs) in stage 2 are shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Suppose that s1 = s2 =0 .T h e n ,i fγ is small, there exist two asymmetric pure-














(Proofs of lemmas and propositions are presented in the Appendix.)
6When the technology gap is small, the ﬁrm with inferior technology may choose a
higher quality than the ﬁrm with superior technology. As a result, there exist multiple
equilibria. When the technology gap is suﬃciently large, on the other hand, the inferior
ﬁrm has no incentive to leapfrog the rival and hence the equilibrium is unique, as shown
by Zhou et al. (2002).
In Figure 1, the two NEs in the unregulated market are given by the intersections of
the solid lines of B1(q2;s1)a n dB2(q1;γ,s2)a tE1 and E2.
We now examine the socially optimal quality pair and the R&D policy to induce ﬁrms
to choose the socially optimal quality pair. Let qH
iS and qL
jS be qualities of the high and
low quality products, respectively, that maximize social welfare when ﬁrm i (resp. ﬁrm
j) produces a high (resp. low) quality product. Then, the following lemma is obtained.


















1S(γ)) are depicted as S1
and S2. The third result in Lemma 2 implies that S1 is socially preferred to S2.I no t h e r
words, social welfare is higher when ﬁrm 1, the ﬁrm with superior technology, produces a
higher quality product. Because of this property, the following two roles are required to
the government policy: The ﬁrst role is to correct the distortion in ﬁrms’ quality choices
and the second role is to select the socially preferred equilibrium. The optimal R&D
policy in the case of small technology gap is then as shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under duopoly with price competition in stage 3, if there is a small tech-
7nology gap between ﬁrms, the optimal R&D policy is given by subsidy schedules:
s1

            
            
= sH
1 (γ) > 0, if q1 >q 2 and q2 ≤ ˆ q2(0),
≤ sH
1 (γ), if q1 <q 2 and q2 ≤ ˆ q2(0),
=ˆ s1, if q1 <q 2 and q2 ≥ ˆ q2(0),




            
            
= sL
2(γ) > 0, if q1 >q 2 and q1 ≥ ˆ q1(0,γ),
≤ sL
2(γ), if q1 <q 2 and q1 ≥ ˆ q1(0,γ),
=ˆ s2, if q1 <q 2 and q1 ≤ ˆ q1(0,γ),
≤ ˆ s2, if q1 >q 2 and q1 ≤ ˆ q1(0,γ),
(5)
where sH
1 (γ) and sL
2(γ) are implicitly deﬁned by B1(qL
2S(γ);sH





2S(γ),a n dˆ s1 and ˆ s2 are subsidies that jointly eliminate the equi-
librium where q1 <q 2. There is a unique SPNE outcome, in which q1 >q 2.
The proposition shows that the government can pick the socially preferred equilibrium
outcome by implementing a properly designed policy schedule.7 The optimal policy is a
subsidy schedule. While the government commits to the schedule in stage 1, the actual
subsidy rate to each ﬁrm is determined when ﬁrms decide their product qualities in stage
2.8 In the policy schedules, sH
1 (γ) induces ﬁrm 1 to choose qH
1S(γ)a n dsL
2(γ) induces ﬁrm
2t oc h o o s eqL
2S(γ). Moreover, ˆ s1 and ˆ s2 jointly eliminate the less preferred equilibrium.
The other elements in the policy schedules are aimed at leaving the switching points ˆ q1
and ˆ q2 unchanged in order to make sure S1 is the unique equilibrium in stage 2. Note
7This is similar to what Jinji (2003) shows in the context of strategic trade policy. In a model of third-market trade, he
shows that the government of an exporting country uses a similar policy schedule to maximize its own domestic welfare.
8When the policy is a subsidy schedule, si depends on q1 and q2. Firms take this into account when they choose product
qualities. However, since si does not respond to a marginal change in qi, the standard analysis of SPNE is valid.
8that for a given γ, sH
1 (γ)a n dsL
2(γ) are uniquely determined, while ˆ s1 and ˆ s2 are not
uniquely determined. Thus, while the SPNE outcome is unique, there are many SPNEs
that produce the same outcome. In the unique SPNE outcome, (qH
1S(γ),qL
2S(γ)) is chosen
and the government provides subsidies sH
1 (γ)a n dsL
2(γ) to ﬁrm 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 1 shows how the optimal R&D policy works. The dotted lines are ﬁrms’ quality
best-response curves with the optimal R&D policy. An R&D subsidy sH
1 (γ) shifts up the
left part of B1 a n da nR & Ds u b s i d ysL
2(γ) shifts the left part of B2 to the right. As for
the right parts of B1 and B2,ˆ s1 and ˆ s2 shift them so that there is no intersection between
them in q1 <q 2. One example is drawn in Figure 1. Eﬀects of the other elements in (4)
and (5) are not seen in the ﬁgure, because they aﬀect the undrawn parts of B1 and B2.
As a corollary of Proposition 1, the optimal R&D policies in cases of γ =1a n d
suﬃciently large γ are obtained.
Corollary 1 (i) If γ =1 , the single subsidy schedule is an optimal R&D policy:
si

            
            
= sH
1 (1) > 0, if qi >q j and qj ≤ ˆ q,
≤ sH
1 (1), if qi <q j and qj ≤ ˆ q,
= sL
2(1) > 0, if qi <q j and qj ≥ ˆ q,
≤ sL
2(1), if qi >q j and qj ≥ ˆ q,
(6)
where sH
1 (1) and sL
2(1) are implicitly deﬁned by B1(qL
S;sH
1 (1)) = B2(qL
S;sH







S. There are two SPNE outcomes, which are
identical except for the identity of the ﬁrms.
(ii) If γ is suﬃciently large, a combination of s1 = sH
1 (γ) > 0 and s2 = sL
2(γ) > 0 is
an optimal R&D policy. There is a unique SPNE, in which q1 >q 2.
9Note that for γ =1w eh a v eˆ q1(0,γ)=ˆ q2(0) ≡ ˆ q, qH
1S(γ)=qH
2S(γ) ≡ qH




S. The schedule (6) is derived by substituting ˆ s1 = sL
2(1) in (4) and ˆ s2 = sH
1 (1)
in (5). The second part of the corollary is obtained by substituting ˆ s1 = sH
1 (γ) in (4) and
ˆ s2 = sL
2(γ) in (5) and choosing equalities for all elements in the schedules (4) and (5).
Corollary 1 implies that the symmetric and the large gap cases are special cases of
the small gap case. If γ = 1, the optimal policy is still a subsidy schedule. However,
the schedule is not necessarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc, because social welfare is independent of the
identity of the ﬁrms. If γ is suﬃciently large, on the other hand, the traditional ﬂat subsidy
can be optimal, while the subsidy rate has to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Since the unregulated NE is
unique in this case, the R&D policy has only to correct the distortion in product quality.
Note that even when the NE in the unregulated market is unique, the policy speciﬁed in
Corollary 1 (ii) may create an NE where q1 <q 2, if the technology gap is not signiﬁcantly
large. In other words, the ﬂat subsidy to each ﬁrm may cause the multiple equilibria.
That case is included in the small gap case rather than the large gap case.
4 R&D Policy under Cournot Competition
We now turn to the case in which ﬁrms compete in quantities in the ﬁnal stage. Each




     
     
qi(2qi − qj)2
(4qi − qj)2 , if qi >q j,
qi(qj)2
(4qj − qi)2, if qi <q j,
(7)
for i,j =1 ,2.
Firms 1 and 2’s proﬁts are given by πc1(q1,q 2;s1)=Rc1(q1,q 2) − (1 − s1)F(q1), and
10πc2(q1,q 2;γ,s2)=Rc2(q1,q 2) − (1 − s2)γF(q2), respectively.9 Firm 1’s quality best-
response, q1 = ˜ B1(q2;s1), is characterized by ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) and given by
˜ B1(q2;s1)=˜ qH
1 (q2;s1)i fq2 ≤ ˜ q2(s1)a n d ˜ B1(q2;s1)=˜ qL
1 (q2;s1)i fq2 ≥ ˜ q2(s1), where
˜ q2(s1)s a t i s ﬁ e sπc1(˜ qH
1 (˜ q2;s1), ˜ q2(s1);s1)=πc1(˜ qL
1 (˜ q2;s1), ˆ q2(s1);s1).10 Firm 2’s quality
best-response, q2 = ˜ B2(q1;γ,s2), is deﬁned analogously. The properties of ˜ Bi(qj;si)a r e
as follows: (i) ˜ Bi(qj;si)  = qj,∀qj; (ii) ˜ Bi(qj;si) is discontinuous at qj =˜ qj(si); (iii)
d ˜ Bi(qj;si)/dqj > 0f o rqj ≤ ˜ qj(si); (iv) d ˜ Bi(qj;si)/dqj < 0f o rqj ≥ ˜ qj(si); and (v)
d ˜ Bi(qj;si)/dsi > 0. The third and fourth properties imply that qualities are strategic
complements for the higher quality producer and strategic substitutes for the lower quality
producer.









. The situation is depicted in Figure 2.
The solid lines of ˜ Bi represent ﬁrm i’s quality best-response in the unregulated market.
It is upward sloping for qi >q j and downward sloping for qi <q j.T h et w oN E sa r eg i v e n
by the intersections of ˜ B1 and ˜ B2 at ˜ E1 and ˜ E2.
The main diﬀerence from the Bertrand case is that subsidy for the ﬁrm producing
a lower quality product is negative in this case. That is, R&D tax rather than subsidy
should be applied to the low quality producer. The optimal subsidy for the high quality
producer is again positive.11 The optimal R&D policy is then as follows:
Proposition 2 Under duopoly with quantity competition in stage 3, if there is a small
9We assume regularity conditions on πci that guarantee concavity of the welfare function.
10Although the proﬁt functions in the case of quantity competition are not locally concave for some qualities, the quality
best-responses are, as Aoki (2003) shows, characterized by FOCs, rather than corner solutions.
11These results are qualitatively the same as what Toshimitsu (2003) has shown.
11technology gap between ﬁrms, the optimal R&D policy is given by subsidy schedules:
s1

            
            
=˜ sH
1 (γ) > 0, if q1 >q 2 and q2 ≤ ˜ q2(0),
≤ ˜ sH
1 (γ), if q1 <q 2 and q2 ≤ ˜ q2(0),
=ˆ s 
1, if q1 <q 2 and q2 ≥ ˜ q2(0),
≤ ˆ s 




            
            
=˜ sL
2(γ) < 0, if q1 >q 2 and q1 ≥ ˜ q1(0,γ),
≤ ˜ sL
2(γ), if q1 <q 2 and q1 ≥ ˜ q1(0,γ),
=ˆ s 
2, if q1 <q 2 and q1 ≤ ˜ q1(0,γ),
≤ ˆ s 
2, if q1 >q 2 and q1 ≤ ˜ q1(0,γ),
(9)
where ˜ sH
1 (γ) and ˜ sL
2(γ) are implicitly deﬁned by ˜ B1(˜ qL
2S(γ); ˜ sH





2S(γ) and ˆ s 
1 and ˆ s 
2 jointly eliminate the equilibrium where q1 <q 2.
As in the Bertrand case, there is a unique SPNE outcome where ﬁrm 1 produces a higher
quality product. In the equilibrium outcome, the government provides an R&D subsidy
˜ sH
1 (γ)t oﬁ r m1a n di m p o s e sa nR & Dt a x˜ sL
2(γ)o nﬁ r m2 . 12
The situation is depicted in Figure 2. The dotted lines are ˜ B1 and ˜ B2 with the optimal
R&D policy. An R&D subsidy ˜ sH
1 (γ) shifts up the left part of B1 and an R&D tax ˜ sL
2(γ)
shifts the left part of B2 to the left. As for the right parts of B1 and B2,ˆ s 
1 and ˆ s 
2 shift
them so that there is no intersection between them in q1 <q 2.
The result is partly similar to what Lahiri and Ono (1999) show. The government
helps the ﬁrm with relatively better technology to choose a higher quality product at the
socially optimal level. For the inferior ﬁrm, the government not only prevents it from
12As in the Bertrand case, with γ = 1 a single subsidy schedule is an optimal R&D policy and with a suﬃciently large γ
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬂat subsidy is an optimal R&D policy.
12choosing a higher quality but also taxes its R&D even if it would choose a lower quality.
The R&D subsidy on the high quality producer and the R&D tax on the low quality
producer raise the degree of product diﬀerentiation. The increased product diﬀerentiation
expands the market share of the high quality producer, which is welfare-improving. This
is similar to Lahiri and Ono’s (1988) result in the case of heterogeneous production costs
among ﬁrms. They show that a cost reduction in the ﬁrm with lower marginal cost
expands its market share and reduces the market share of less eﬃcient ﬁrms and that
the shift in production from less eﬃcient ﬁrms to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm improves social
welfare. In our case, an expansion in the market share of the high quality producer
improves social welfare. Our result is also related to what Symeonidis (2003b) shows.
In a mixture of horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation, he shows that an increase in the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is welfare improving.
These results contrast with the results in the Bertrand case. Recall that in the Bertrand
case the government subsidizes R&D of the low quality ﬁrm as well as the high quality ﬁrm.
Since products are too much diﬀerentiated in order to soften the price competition, the
quality of the low quality product is too low from social point of view. Thus, increasing the
quality of low quality product and reducing the degree of product diﬀerentiation improve
social welfare. Unlike the Cournot case, expanding the market share of the high quality
producer is not necessarily welfare-improving by itself. Note that while the incentive
to soften the price competition tends to raise the quality of the high quality product, its
quality level in the unregulated market is still too low from social point of view. Therefore,
a subsidy on the high quality producer is also required.
135 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the optimal R&D policy in a duopolistic industry where
goods are diﬀerentiated in quality and ﬁrms invest in R&D to improve product qualities.
We have considered the optimal R&D subsidy/tax in a second-best environment where
the government takes the market structure as given. Our focus has been on the case of
asymmetric duopoly in the sense that the cost of product R&D is diﬀerent across ﬁrms.
We have shown that the optimal R&D policy is characterized by ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy
schedules that are contingent on ﬁrms’ quality choices. There exist two asymmetric Nash
equilibria and social welfare is higher in the equilibrium where the ﬁrm with superior tech-
nology produces a high quality product. Thus, the R&D policy needs to not only correct
the distortion in ﬁrms’ quality choices but also select the socially preferred equilibrium.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy schedules induce the superior ﬁrm to produce the high qual-
ity product at the optimal quality level and the inferior ﬁrm to produce the low quality
product at the optimal quality level.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy schedule contingent on all ﬁrms’ R&D activities may seem
to be less practical. In the real world, however, it is observed that research grants for
product R&D are allocated to projects by diﬀerent amounts, depending on the evaluation
of project goals and other elements of all applications. This can be interpreted as an
example of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy schedule contingent on quality choices.
The results in this paper imply that it is crucial for the design of the optimal policies
in vertically diﬀerentiated industries to take into account the endogeneity of quality or-
dering. Although it is common in the literature of vertical diﬀerentiation to focus on one
equilibrium, it may obscure some important properties of the model.
14For the future research, a number of potentially interesting extensions of the analysis
in this paper can be considered. First of all, it will be interesting to introduce uncertainty
of the outcome of R&D activities into the model. In the real world, R&D activities are
typically subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Introducing uncertainty will add some
additional factors to the optimal R&D policy. It may also be interesting to incorporate the
dynamic aspect of R&D activities, which is sometimes emphasized in the literature. More-
over, informational asymmetry between ﬁrms and the government is sometimes pointed
out as a potential obstacle for the government to implement the optimal policy. Thus,
in order to discuss further the implementation of the optimal R&D policy, it may be
important to take informational asymmetry into account.
15A Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Aoki (2003) proves the existence of two pure-strategy NEs under symmetric duopoly,
that is, in the case of γ =1 .Z h o uet al. (2002) prove that with a suﬃciently large tech-
nology gap, there exist a unique NE where the ﬁrm with superior technology produces
a high quality product. Since Zhou et al. (2002) prove their result under the assump-
tion of a general convex cost function, their result can apply to our case as well. Since
dqH
1 (q2)/dq2 > 0, dqL
2(q1)/dq1 > 0, dqL
2/dγ < 0, and dˆ q1/dγ < 0, then together with
Aoki’s result there must exist an NE where q1 >q 2 for γ ≥ 1. As for the NE where
q1 <q 2, the results shown by Aoki (2003) and Zhou et al. (2002) imply that an NE
exists for a small γ but no NE exists for a suﬃciently large γ. Suﬃcient conditions on
γ for the existence of the NE where q1 <q 2 in the case of n = 2 are as follows. Since
qH
2 (0) = 1/8kγ and 1/18k ≤ ˆ q2 ≤ 1/12k,t h e nqH
2 (0) > ˆ q2 if 1/8kγ > 1/12k,o rγ<3/2.
It holds that 1/48k<q L
1 (1/12k) < 1/47k.S i n c e1 /18kγ ≤ ˆ q1 ≤ 1/12kγ,t h e nqL
1 (ˆ q2) < ˆ q1
if 1/18kγ > 1/47k,o rγ<47/18 ≈ 2.61. Thus, if γ<3/2, there exists an NE where
q1 <q 2. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Consider ﬁrst the case of q1 >q 2.L e tqH
1 (qL
2 ) be quality of the high (resp. low) quality
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H ≡ ∂RH/∂qH and so on.
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H − F  (qH
1 )=0a n dπ2L
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2N) > 0. This implies that qH
1N <q H
1S. Similarly, we ob-
tain dW 1/dqL
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HH > 0. This implies that qL
2N <q L
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1S in the case of q1 <q 2.




























































1 )i ss o c i a l
welfare in the case of q1 <q 2. Evaluate (A.2) and (A.3) at (qH,qL)=( qH
2S(γ),qL
1S(γ))

















1S(γ)) = γF (qH
2S(γ)) − F  (qH
2S(γ)) > 0, because γ>1
and F  (·) > 0. This implies that qH
1S(γ) >q H
2S(γ). Similarly, evaluate (A.3) at (qH,qL)=
(qH
2S(γ),qL







1S(γ)) =( 1− γ)F  (qL
1S(γ)) < 0,
which implies that qL
1S(γ) >q L
2S(γ).































































Evaluate (A.6) at (qH
1S(γ),qL
2S(γ)) and (A.7) at (qH
2S(γ),qL




2 (γ)) < 0, and dW 2/dγ|(qH
2S,qL
1S) = −F(qH
2 (γ)) < 0. For a
given γ we have qH
2 (γ) >q L






















2 (γ)) − F(q
L
2 (γ)) > 0, (A.8)
which implies that, for a given γ, a marginal increase in γ reduces W 2 more than
W 1.S i n c e W 1(qH
1S(1),qL
2S(1)) = W 2(qH
2S(1),qL





1S(γ)) for γ marginally higher than 1. Moreover, since (A.8) holds for any




1S(γ)) holds for any
feasible γ ≥ 1. 
18A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Since W is higher at S1, the government induces ﬁrms to choose (qH
1S,qL
2S). The FOCs for

























1(q1,q 2) ≡ ∂R1(q1,q 2)/∂q1 and so on. Use the FOCs for each ﬁrm to maximize



















=0 ,i =1 ,2. (A.10)
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21 =0 ,t h e n|D| c a nb er e w r i t t e na s|D| = −R2
22(1 − s1)F   (q1) − π1
11(1 − s2)γF  (q2). Since
R2
22 < 0a n dπ1
11 < 0f o rb o t hq1 >q 2 and q1 <q 2 and since F   (·) > 0a n dγ>1, then |D| > 0.
19When q1 >q 2,i ti ss h o w nt h a tR2
1 + CS1 =( 2 q1 + q2)(q1 − q2)/(4q1 − q2)2 > 0a n d
R1
2 + CS2 =3 ( q1)2/{2(4q1 − q2)2} > 0. Since F  (·) > 0a n dγ>1, for q1 >q 2
s
∗




1 (γ) > 0, (A.13)
s
∗





2(γ) > 0. (A.14)





























































































































qj)4 < 0i fqi >q j and Ri
ii + R
j
ii + CSii = −(qj)2(4qj +1 7 qi)/(4qj − qi)4 < 0i fqi <q j,
i,j =1 ,2, i  = j.F o r ∂2W/(∂q1∂q2)=R1
12 + R2
12 + CS12,w eh a v eRi
ij + R
j
ij + CSij =
qiqj(4qi +1 7 qj)/(4qi − qj)4 > 0f o rqi >q j.W ea l s oh a v eπi
ii < 0a n dF   (qi) > 0, i =1 ,2.
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     
     
−
3qiqjΓiF  (qi)F   (qj)
(4qi − qj)3|D|
< 0, if qi >q j,
−
9qiqjΓiF  (qi)F   (qj)
(4qj − qi)3|D|
< 0, if qi <q j.
Thus, in any case it yield that d2W/(dsi)2|(s∗
1,s∗
2) < 0,i =1 ,2.
20In order to ensure that (qH
1S,qL
2S) is chosen in equilibrium, another NE (E2)w h e r e
q1 <q 2 must be eliminated. E2 can be eliminated by implementing R&D subsidies
s1 =ˆ s1 for q1 <q 2 with q2 ≥ ˆ q2 and s2 =ˆ s2 for q1 <q 2 with q1 ≤ ˆ q1.W e s h o w a n
example of (ˆ s1,ˆ s2)i nt h ec a s eo fn = 2. Suppose that ˆ s2 =0 .S i n c edBi(qj;si)/dqj > 0
and since 1/8kγ < qH
2 (q1;0)< 7/48kγ for q1 ≤ 1/18kγ, there is no NE where q1 <q 2 if
qL
1 (1/8kγ;ˆ s1) > 1/18kγ. Suppose that γ = 1. Then, it is numerically shown that with
ˆ s1 =0 .823, qL
1(1/8k;ˆ s1) ≈ 0.05563/k > 1/18k ≈ 0.05556/k.S i n c e dqH
2 /dγ < 0a n d
dˆ q1/dγ < 0, then for γ>1, a lower ˆ s1 will work. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
As in the Bertrand case, Aoki (2003) proves that there exist two pure-strategy NEs in
the case of γ =1a n dZ h o uet al. (2002) prove that if the technology gap is suﬃciently
large, there exist a unique NE in which the ﬁrm with superior technology produces a high
quality product. Since d˜ qH
1 (q2)/dq2 > 0, d˜ qL
2(q1)/dq1 < 0, d˜ qL
2 /dγ < 0, and d˜ q1/dγ < 0,
then together with Aoki’s result there must exist an NE where q1 >q 2 for γ ≥ 1. The
results shown by Aoki and Zhou et al. imply that an NE where q1 <q 2 exists for a small
γ but no NE exists for a suﬃciently large γ.
Use the procedure that is similar to what we used in the proof of Proposition 1 to
















When q1 >q 2,i ti ss h o w nt h a tRc2
1 +CSc
1 = {2q1(q1−q2)+2(q1)2−(q2)2}/{2(4q1−q2)2} > 0
21and Rc1
2 + CSc




2q1(q1 − q2)+2 ( q1)2 − (q2)2
2(4q1 − q2j)2F  (q1)
≡ ˜ s
H





2(4q1 − q2)2F  (q2)
≡ ˜ s
L
2(γ) < 0. (A.17)
We assume F   (·) > 0 is suﬃciently large to ensure the SOCs are satisﬁed, i.e.,
d2W c/(dsi)2|(˜ s∗
1,˜ s∗
2) < 0,i=1 ,2. In order to ensure that (˜ qH
1S, ˜ qL
2S) is chosen in equilib-
rium, the government needs to eliminate ˜ E2.W es h o wa ne x a m p l eo f( ˆ s 
1,ˆ s 
2)i nt h ec a s eo f
n = 2. Suppose that ˆ s 
1 =0a n dt h a tγ =1 .S i n c e1 /8k(1−s2) < ˜ qH
2 (q1) < 7/54k(1−s2)
for q1 ≤ 5/54k(1 − s2) and since 5/54k ≤ ˜ q2 ≤ 1/9k,t h e n˜ E2 is eliminated if
7/54k(1 − s2) < 5/54k,o rˆ s 
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Figure 2: Nash equilibria under quantity competition: Small technology gap
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